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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REGULATIONS AFFECTING PROPERTY IN
GENERAL - STATUTE AFFECTING THE RIGHT OF ILLEGITIMATES TO
INHERIT INTESTATE FROM FATHER UPHELD
Intestate died on January 7, 1973, in the state of New York.'
The appellant petitioned for a compulsory accounting claiming that
he and his sister were illegitimate children of the intestate and as
such were entitled to inherit from his estate. 2 The appellee,
administratrix of the estate, opposed the petition on the basis of a
New York statute3 which prevents illegitimate children who had
not obtained an order of filiation4 during the father's lifetime from
inheriting from his estate.' Appellant argued that this statute was in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 6 The court ruled
that the appellant was properly excluded as distributee of the estate
and therefore lacked status to petition for a compulsory
accounting.7 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.8 The case
I. l.alli v.Lalli. 439 U.S. 259.261 (1978).
2. Id.
3. The New York statute provides in relevant part as follows:
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue
inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of
the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted
d iring the pregnancy ofthe mother or within two sears from the birth ofthe child.
N'. Esr., POWRS & TRUSTS Lsw .4-1.2 (McKinney 1967).
4. 439 U.S. at 262. A filiation proceeding is a "special statutorv proceeding. criminal in form.
but in the nature of a civil action to eifbrce a civil obligation or dsit\ specifical" for li ie purpose of
est allishing parentage and the putative faiither's dut  to support his illegititate chiild.- B iAs.K's LA\\
DIcTioN.\Rv 566 (5th ed. 1979).
5. 439 U.S. at 262.
6. Id- The equal protection clause proides that no state shall -dens any- person within its
jur isdictiin the equal protection of the law. " U .S. CoNsT. atniid. VIV.
7. 4:19 U. S. at 263.
8. Id.
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was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
vacated and remanded to permit further consideration in light of
Trimble v. Gordon. 9 On remand, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed its earlier decision and the appellant appealed to the
United States Supreme Court again. 10 A plurality of the Court"
held that New York's interest in the just and orderly disposition of
property at death was substantial and therefore the statute
requiring an order of filiation during the father's lifetime was
constitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.12 Lalliv. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
At earliest common law an illegitimate was considered nullius
filius, 13 which means the son of no one, and therefore had no
inheritance rights. 14  The premise originated in medieval
England.15 During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the church
and state were so entwined that church courts were given exclusive
jurisdiction in certain civil matters, one of which was bastardy. 16
Canon law punished the illegitimate child for the sin of his
parents by prohibiting him from obtaining_ an inheritance.17
The purpose of such a rule was to encourage marriage and the
maintenance of the family.' 8 This edict was reinforced by a
provision in English law which provided that if there was no
claimant to the land other than an illegitimate child, the land
escheated to the lord of the estate. 19 Thus, those in authority
profited from the promulgation of such a rule. Nulliusfilius became
so ingrained in English society that it was not until 1926 that
9. Id. In Trimble the Court held that the Illinois Probate Code could not prohibit an illegitimate
child from inheriting from her father while allowing a legitimate to inherit from both parents. The
Court based its decision on the equal protection clause, noting that the statute could not be justified
through the state's interest in promoting the family or establishing orderly disposition of property.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
The situation in Lalli also concerned an illegitimate challenging the restriction of his rights
under a statute, using the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The recent decision
ofthe same issue under a similar statute led the Court to remand Lalli. 439 U.S. at 264
10. 439 U.S. at 264.
11. Id. The plurality held for the state of New York, with two of the.justices agreeing with the
decision but not joining in the opinion. Onejustice would affirm on the basis of Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971), and overrule Trimble. 439 U.S. at 276 (Blackmun,.J., concurring). The other
Justice concurred for reasons stated in his Trimble dissent, which reasoned that a distinction between
legitimates and illegitimates was not irrational and therefore did not violate equal protection because
legitimates and illegitimates were not similarly situated. 430 U.S. at 777 (Rihnquist, .J..
concurring), as cited in 439 U.S. at 276.
12. 439 U.S. at 275-76.
13. I W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARtES* 459.
14. Id.
15.J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 56 (1971).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 263.
18. Stenger, The Supreme Court and Illegitimacy: 1958-I977, 11 FANt. L. Q. 368 (1978).
19. 2 W,. BI.ACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES* 247.
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illegitimates gained inheritance rights in England. 20
In the United States the harshness of the common law rule led
to statutory modifications much earlier than in England. 21 While
the Supreme Court recognized the common law rule denying
illegitimates any and all inheritance rights, it also held that the rule
could be modified by statute. 22 In Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivant, 23 the
Court held that a state statute giving illegitimates and legitimates
an equal right to inherit from their mother supplanted the other-
wise pervasive common law rule. 24 Such statutes were also held to
permit illegitimates to inherit from their fathers if the court was
satisfied that the intestate was the actual father. 25 All of the fifty
states eventually passed such statutes eliminating the
discriminatory effects of the common law rule. 26
In 1968 the United States Supreme Court began to apply the
equal protection clause to statutes involving illegitimate
classification. Beginning with Levy v. Louisiana27 and Glona v.
American Guaranty and Life Insurance Co., 28 the Court applied the
rational basis test for determining whether the distinction be-
tween legitimates and illegitimates was discriminatory. 29  In
determining whether a particular classification of illegitimates has a
rational basis, the Court has consistently found that such a basis
does not exist where the injury caused has no relation to the
illegitimacy of the child. 30 Thus in these cases, because suits for
wrongful death of an illegitimate's mother 3 1 or a mother suing for
her illegitimate son's wrongful death32 had no relation to the
20. legitimacy Act. 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 15, ch. 60. § 9, as cited in.j. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION
",) EN ISt LEGAIL HISTORY 263 (1971).
21. Annot., 41 L. Ed.2d 1228, 1235 (1974). One of the first of these statutory modifications was
the Virginia Act of 1785 which provided that "[wihere a man having by a woman one or more
children, shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, such child or children if recognized by him
shall therebv bIe legitimated." 1785 Vs\. ACTS, as cited in Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 207. 208 (1820).
22. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 207. 261 (1820). Although the Court found the appellant illegitimate
could not inherit from his brother because no statute replaced this aspect of common law, it did
recognize the right of a state to make a law so as to give illegitimates inheritance rights. Id.
23. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 207 (1820).
24. Id. at 261.
25. Cope v. Cope. 137 U.S. 682 (1891). In Cope, the Court allowed an illegitimate son to inherit
equally. with his legitimate brother, because of a state statute which provided for such equality even
though the illegitimiate was not acknowledged. Id.
26. 47 NOTRE DAMtE LAW. 392. 398 (1971) (citing DIGEST OF INHERITANCE LAWS (VA Pamphlet
20-66-1) (1966 & Supp. 1969)).
27. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
28. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
29. Levv v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Glona v. American Guar. and Life Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968). The rational basis test requires the courts to determine "whether the
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose .... McLaughlin v. Florida.
379 U.S. 184. 191 (1964).
30. 391 U.S. 68, 72(1968).
3:1. Id.
32. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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illegitimate status, statutes denying these rights were held
unconstitutional. 33
Illegitimacy as a classification has, however, been found valid
when such a classification would serve a legitimate state interest. 34
In Labine v. Vincent 35 the Court used the rational basis test to deny
an illegitimate, acknowledged but not legitimated by her father,
sole rights to his estate, when other relatives also claimed the
estate. 36 The Court cited the state's interest in promoting the
family 37 and efficient disposition of property 38 as proper objectives
for the distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. Attention
was focused on alternatives the father could have pursued if he had
intended the child to inherit. 39  Because there was no
insurmountable barrier to prevent inheritance, the Court found the
statute valid.40
While the Court has stated that punishing an illegitimate for
his parent's irresponsible liasons beyond the bonds of marriage was
"illogical and unjust," 41 it has nevertheless denied illegitimates the
protection of strict scrutiny. 42 This status 43 has been denied because
while illegitimacy is, like race and sex, an accident of birth, it lacks
33.391 U.S- 68(1968), 391 U.S. 73(1968).
34. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
35. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). In Labine an illegitimate's right to sole inheritance was denied even
though she was acknowledged. The Court ruled in favor of collateral relatives and upheld a Louisi-
ana statute whith required the illegitimate to he legitimated as well as acknowledged. Id.
36. Id The relevant parts of the Louisiana Civil Code provide that "[illlegitimate children.
thotgh dttly acknowlhdgitl, cannot claim the rights of legitiiate children. . .. "L... Civ. CootE
ANN. art. 206 (1870). Further, "[nlatural children are called to the inheritance of their natural
fitidwr, who has duly acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor
collaitral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the exclusion only ofthe State.'" LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 919(1870).
37. 411 U.S. at 536-39. The Court pointed out that a state has the right to make a social
Judgment to promote the family and to pass laws to promote such an h-jective, Id.
38. Id. at 538. The Court emphasized that it could not place its.judgment above the state's in
deciding what furthered either family life or estate disposition. Id.
39. Id. at 539. The Court suggested that the child's father could have left a will, or married his
daughtter's mother, or finally, that he could have stated in his acknowledgment ofpaternity his desire
t, igititiat his daughter. Id.
40. Id.
41. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). In Weber the Court applied
l,'vy v. l,ouisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), rather than labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
emphasizing that the facts in Weber dealt with illegitimate's rights to workmen's compensation. The
Court explained that a state traditionally has a strong prerogative to regulate the disposition of
property within its borders, which was at issue in Labine, but that its right to regulate in other areas
could not be connected with such a substantial state purpose. 406 U.S. at 175.
42. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (citing San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriquez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). In Rodriquez, the Court found those entitled to strict scrutiny to be
"saddled with such disahilities, or sui*ected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated toi such a position of political lotwerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
dIi tiJiritarian political process.' 411 U.S. at 28.
43. 406 U.S. at 172 (1972). The Court will apply the strict scrutiny standard to state statutory
classilications which approach sensitive fundamental personal rights. Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The application of'"strict" scrutiny is so "aggressive" that its end result is the
rmicttiiin of the statute. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Forei'ord. In Search of Evolvine
Doctrin ron a Chaning Court: A Alodel.for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. R iv. 1, 8 (1972).
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the traditional hardships that these categories have endured. 44 The
comparative lack of discrimination illegitimates have faced has
prompted the Court to deny them the extraordinary protection
given a suspect class. 45
It must be kept in mind, however, that while the Court will not
apply the standard of strict scrutiny, it has stated in Mathews v.
Lucas4 6 that illegitimates are not to endure "toothless" scrutiny.
47
Although the exact meaning of this term has not been explained,
the Court has tended to focus on the child and his rights4 8 and
shown disapproval for statutes which exclude both parent and child
from claiming equality for the child. 49
Trimble v. Gordon50  concerned the constitutionality of the
Illinois Probate Code's 5I distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children for purposes of intestate succession. 52 Under
this statute illegitimate children could inherit from both parents. 53
The statute also provided that if an illegitimate wanted to be treated
as legitimate for purposes of intestate succession, his father and
mother would have to marry and the child must be
acknowledged. 54  The United States Supreme Court held the
legitimacy classification for intestate succession violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 55 The Court rejected the state's basis of establishing a
method of property disposition through which proof of a lineal
relationship was more readily ascertainable. 56  It noted that
significant categories of illegitimate children could be recognized
44. 427 U.S. at 506 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973)). In Fronticro,
the Court points out some traditional hardships endured because of race or sex. such as slavery and
denial of the right to vote. 411 U.S. at 684-86 (1973).
45.411 U.S. at 684-86.
46. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
47. Mathews v. Lucas. 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
48. 406 U.S. at 170. In ll'cbcr. which followed Labinr, the Court emphasized that the situation in
l.abie was upheld by the strong presumption that the state had the right to influence the disposition
of estates. Id.
49. Id.
50. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
51. It-t. Rev. STAT. ch. 3. § 12 (1973). The Illinois statute provides in relesvant part as follows:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any
person from whmrn his mother might have inherited, if living: and the lawful issue of
an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take. by descent, any estate
which tIte parent would have taken. if living. A child who was illegitimate whose
parents tttermar\" and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is
legitimate.
Id.
52. Trithle v. Gordon. 430 U.S. 762. 765 (1977).
53. Id. at 764-6..
54. Id. at 765.
55. Id. at 765-6.
56. Id. at 772.
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without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates. -5 7 The Court
reasoned that the statute could not be upheld simply because it
mirrored the moral beliefs of the state's citizens .51 Instead, the state
must consider the effect its standard will have on illegitimates,
taking into account both the vast number of disinherited
illegitimates and the difficulty of proving paternity.
59
In Trimble, the Court took a view different from Labine, which
contained a similar fact situation.60 One distinguishing feature
between Trimble and Labine may be the almost total exclusion the
Illinois statute placed on illegitimates in Trimble.6' There was
nothing the child himself could do to gain succession. 62 The only
means available to the child was acknowledgement and the
marriage of his parents after his birth. This breaks with the basic
premise that one should not be punished for the acts of another"3
and thus the Court found it unconstitutional.
A comparison with the Trimble case was a major component of
the Court's decision in Lalli.64 The Court noted that the same issue,
"whether the remaining statutory obstacles to inheritance by
illegitimate children can be squared with the Equal Protection
Clause, '" 65 was present in both cases. 66 The two cases were
differentiated, however, by the fact that the statute in Trimble was
so narrow that it did not permit even the judicial branch to
intervene on the part of an illegitimate. 67 In Lalli, on the other
hand, the denial of inheritance rights in New York was based on
purely evidentiary, judicial proceedings which the child himself
could initiate. 68 New York's statute did not foreclose rights of an
57. Id. at 771.
58. Id. at 775. The statute was enacted to ecourage lIgitimate IFilly rlationship mid
liaintain an efficient and accurate method of* disposition of un in stait's properiy. lh, Coutl
disposed il'thc first goal by noting that the stalute had only the moost tlietnaled rel i nshi t o Ihi 1
goal and also that persons will not shun lic it relationships simply Ibcause ithey woul no0 riap t1)i-
benefits ihey woM ifthtv were legitimate. Seondly, Ih Court fion dii sltilite iio nirrow to li Ii-
ieit ihc vceond ihijetivc. I. at 768-71.
59. Id. at 770.
60. Id. at 777. The dissini fiund Trimbe indistinguishhhlil frot La/inr and thus wolId afltin
relying on that judgmenm. Id. (Rchnquis,.J., dissenting).
61. I. ;i 770,
62. Id.
63. 1d. at 709-770..,e 406 U.S ati 175.
64. 439 U.S. at 266.
65. Id. The "remaining obstacles" refer to those restrictions leift iom the common law which
prevented an illegitimate from taking any inheritance. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. While the Court hi-d the Trimble statute was too narrow it did recognize the right of
states I require a more demanding standard than ltgitimate chiliren or illegitimates claiming their
miither's istat must meet when they attempt to claim their inlestate fithir's estate. 430 U.S. at 770.
68. 439 U.S. at 267. The Court noted that if the appellant in Trimble had been govertid by the
lai New York statute she woult have inherited. Id.
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illegitimate because of his parents' acts or lack thereof. 69
The Court also took into account New York's goals in
enacting the statute. The rational basis standard7 ° used by the
Court required a tie between the statute and a legitimate state
objective. 7' The only professed goal of the New York statute was
efficient disposition of estates.7 2 The Court recognized that this was
a goal which justified substantial interest by the state. 7 3 Procedural
problems in estate disposition are further complicated when the
relationship between father and child is called into question. 7 4 To
alleviate this the Court found it within the state's rights to force the
child to produce proof of his paternity.17 Finality in the decree of an
estate disposition is a necessity to make the system efficient.7 6
Because due process 77  requires that possible beneficiarieg be
notified before disposition, 78 limiting the time that illegitimates can
claim inheritance rights to the father's time of death allows
significant categories of illegitimates to inherit without putting a
heavy burden on the system. 79 The benefits of fixing such a time for
suit8° justify its existence and outweigh the chance that certain
deserving illegitimates might be excluded.8 ' Thus, by using the
rational basis standard the Court upheld New York's statute
qualifying the rights of illegitimates to inherit. 82
In North Dakota the rights of illegitimates are governed by the
Uniform Parentage Act. 8 3 This act was designed to bring existing
law into conformity with the Supreme Court's rulings on the rights
69. Id.
70. Id. at 273. The Court stated that "inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus
on the abstract 'fairness' ofa state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state interests it is
intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 271.
74. Id. at 269. The Court identified a number of factors that would counsel states to treat
legitimates and illegitimates differently. These factors included the difficulty of proving paternity
when the father is not part of the formal family unit. The father may be unaware of the chil's birth,
or may not be concerned because of lack of ties with the mother. Also, the mother may not be certain
who the father is. Id.
75. Id. at 271.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 270. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution mandates notice and an opportunity to be heard to all necessary parties. Id.
78. Id. If illegitimates are given the right to intestate succession, the state would be required to
furnish notice to all illegitimates. This would place a considerable burden on the state if the service of
process were not significantly limited between the categories of known and unknown illegitimates.
79. Id. at 272.
80. Id. at 271-72. The Court found that fixing the time by which paternity proceedings must be
determined was justified because the administration of an estate would be facilitated. the possibility
of uncertainty and delay would be minimized and fraudulent assertions would he much less likels to
arise. Id.
81. Id. at 272-73.
82. Id. at 275-76.
83. N.D. CENT. CooE . 14-17-06 (Supp. 1977).
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of illegitimates.84 It is aimed at insuring equality for illegitimates in
those areas in which the Court has mandated such equal
treatment. 85 The Act, however, goes beyond the Court's rulings
and attempts to grant equality to even the illegitimate child
inheriting from his intestate father. 86 Basically, the Act enables an
illegitimate child to bring an action to determine the existence of
the father and child relationship until three years after the child
reaches majority. 87
A comparison of the Uniform Parentage Act with the New
York statute at issue in Lalli indicates the probable constitutional
validity of the North Dakota statute. While the two statutes provide
different means for limiting paternity actions - the New York
statute based on the father's lifetime, 88 the North Dakota statute
based on the age of the child 9- both allow a reasonable amount of
time to prove paternity. In addition, the Commissioners'
Comments to the Uniform Parentage Act emphasize that tl~e
framers intended to address the rights of illegitimates in terms of
what the child himself could do to claim his inheritance.
90 The Lalli
decision involved a statute which provided a judicial proceeding
which a child could initiate himself.9 1 The decision also stressed the
state's interest in the efficient disposition of estates, which the
Court readily accepted. 92 The Uniform Parentage Act based its
84. UNIFORI PARENTAGE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note at 580. The Commissioners
quote Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 406 U.S. 164 (1971) and Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973). which dealt with an illegitimate's right to collect workmen's compensation, as cases granting
illegitimates broad equal treatment. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note at
580-8 1.
85. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note at 580.
86. Id. at 581.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-06 (Supp. 1977). The statute reads in relevant part as follows:
An action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship as to a child
who has no presumed father tinder section 14-17-04 may not be brought later than
three years after the birth of the child, or later than three years after July 1, 1975.
whichecver is later. Howevcr, an action brought by or on behalf of a child whose
paternity has not been determined is not barred until three years after the child
reaches the age ofmajority.
Id.
88. 439 U.S. at 262.
89. N.D. CENT, CODE 14-17-06 (Supp. 1977).
90. UNIFORMt PA..RENTACE ACT § 7 Commissioners' Comments. The framers of the Act were
specific in their goals when setting the statute of limitations, as explained in the following excerpt:
iTihis Section provides for a twenty-one-year statute of limitations, except that a late
paternitv action does not affect lasws relating to distribution and closing of decedents'
estates or to the determination of heirship. Since the U.S. Supreme Court decisions
speak in terms of the child's substantive right to a legal relationship with his father, it
was considered unreasonable to bar the child's action by reason of another person's
taihtic to bring a paternity action at an earlier time.
Id.
91. 439 U.S. at 266.
92. Id. at 269.
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limitations on the desire that actions be brought as soon as
possible.9 3 Therefore, it appears that the Uniform Parentage Act
would be upheld under the Lalli standard.
Although other aspects of illegitimate rights, such as the right
to workmen's compensation benefits, 94 seem to have been readily
accepted by the Supreme Court, it appears that the Lalli decision
has firmly implanted the rational basis standard as a means of
analyzing the illegitimate's right to inherit from his intestate father.
This seems to foreclose the possibility that strict scrutiny would
become the standard applied in cases involving illegitimate rights.
By limiting the child's right to determine paternity to the father's
lifetime, the Court stems the tide for further equality that may have
been started in Trimble. The Court, however, leaves open the
question of what would happen if the father were to die before he
could bring an acknowledgment action. In this regard, North
Dakota's Uniform Parentage Act., which is based on the child's
age, is more responsive. 95 The Lalli decision is, however, likely to
influence states to adopt liberal provisions concerning illegitimate
rights while at the same time allowing for the protection of estate
disposition.
SUSAN THORSON
93. UNIFORM PARfNTACF, Ac r§ 7 Cotmissioners' Comnmerit. The Comment states in relevant
part: "l11he three year provision stated in the first sentence of this .Section will serve as an
admonition that paternity actions should he brought promptly.- 1d.
94. Weber v. Aetna Cas. and Stir. Co.. 406 U.S. 164 (1971): Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S, 535
(1973).
The Colrt explained in 14'rbrr that because both legitimate and illegitimate dependent children
would he dtpcndcnt on their fathet for t(he support he ,vottld provide, it vwould be1 unfair to treat thtI
differentl\ under workmen's comp'nsation provisions. 406 U.S. at 169-70. Goirn reiterated these
sentimntls bv stating that legitimates and illcgitiniates otust share equally in the workien's
comipcrinsatio benefits received as the resut of a parent's death. 409 U.S. at 538.
95. N.D. CENT. ConE 14-17-06 (Stipp. 1977). The Uniform Parentage Act aflows a child to
recovetr ft r three years after majoritv withbut reference to parental status. Id.
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